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GAY SCOUT LEADER WINS COURT RULING AGAINST DISMISSAL
Copyright 1994 The San Diego Union-Tribune
The San Diego Union-Tribune
July 8, 1994, Friday
Anne Krueger, Staff Writer
A San Diego Superior Court judge ruled
yesterday that state law prohibits the Boy Scouts
from discriminating against an Explorer Scout leader
who was ousted from the organization after he
revealed he is homosexual. The ruling by Judge
Anthony Joseph -- the first judge in the country to
rule in favor of a homosexual Boy Scout leader --
was hailed by gay leaders and condemned by those
who support the Boy Scouts' exclusion of gays. The
decision came in the case of El Cajon police Officer
Chuck Merino, who sued the Boy Scouts following
his ouster from the organization in August 1992 after
he announced that he is gay.
Though Joseph's ruling was eagerly awaited
by both sides, it is not expected to have any
immediate effect on the organization. The Boy
Scouts vow to appeal it, and Merino's lawyer,
Everett Bobbitt, estimated it may take three years to
resolve the issue if the case is decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Bobbitt said that he will ask San Diego City
Manager Jack McGrory to remove the Boy Scouts
from their city-owned land at Balboa Park and Fiesta
Island, which the Scouts lease for $1 a year. If no
action is taken, Bobbitt said he will renew his
lawsuit against the city, which was dropped from the
case, because he claims the Scouts are violating a
city ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
Merino, 38, was thankful for yesterday's
ruling, saying it showed that it was more important
"to accept people for the deeds that they do vs. any
labels that people put on them. . . . I think my
record shows I've done nothing but outstanding work
for the Boy Scouts."
Merino had run the El Cajon Police
Department's Explorer group since 1988. After he
was expelled from the Boy Scouts, the El Cajon and
San Diego police departments severed their ties with
the group. Though he sued for reinstatement, Joseph
ruled that he could not order Merino reinstated
because the officer had not requested an
administrative hearing before Scouting officials, as
the Scouts allow, to protest his expulsion.
Michael Edwards, a lawyer for the Boy
Scouts, vowed that the Boy Scouts would not change
their policy despite Joseph's ruling. "The principles
of the Boy Scouts are not for sale and they will not
change, Edwards said.
The state Supreme Court has agreed to hear
two cases centering on whether the Boy Scouts can
exclude gays and atheists from their ranks. Edwards
said he will ask that Merino's case be sent directly to
the state's high court to speed the appeal process.
Legal experts said the only other legal challenge to
the Boy Scouts' exclusion of homosexuals is in a
New Jersey case that has not been decided. In that
case, Eagle Scout James Dale sued the Scouts after
they terminated his membership when he revealed
that he is gay.
A key issue in the Merino case was whether
the Boy Scouts are a business that falls under the
provisions of the state Unruh Act, which prohibits
businesses from discriminating based on sexual
orientation, religion and other characteristics. A Los
Angeles appeals court, in one of the cases before the
state Supreme Court, ruled in March that the Boy
Scouts are not a business and therefore could
prohibit a homosexual from becoming an assistant
scoutmaster.
But Joseph ruled that the Scouts are a
business, saying they are a large public organization
with a national membership that includes more than
4.1 million youths and almost 1.2 million adults. He
noted that the Scouts have an open membership
policy, conduct many public activities and engage in
commercial enterprises, such as a Scout store that
sells scouting equipment.
Joseph ruled that the Boy Scouts are
violating the state civil rights act by discriminating
against homosexuals, and have no constitutional right
to exclude homosexuals. "This court's determination
is the Boy Scouts may not exclude or remove
avowed homosexuals from membership in the Boy
Scouts unless the conduct of such person is violative
of Boy Scout rules which apply equally to all Boy
Scout members without regard to homosexuality,"
Joseph wrote.
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Joseph said Merino furthered Scouting's
goals while he was a leader and never discussed his
sexuality with the Explorers in his post. "Public
acknowledgment of homosexuality does not translate
to a teaching' that homosexuality is proper or
improper any more than a Scout admitting he is a
Catholic amounts to a teaching' that Catholicism is
the only proper' religion," Joseph said in his ruling.
But Darrell Watkins, director of the Boy
Scouts' Desert Pacific Council serving San Diego
County, said in a written statement that the Boy
Scouts have a duty to exclude homosexuals as scout
leaders. "Scouting is based on high principles,
enduring values and is a positive force in society. It
is our responsibility to make sure our youth have
scouting as a positive alternative to the growing gang
problem in San Diego and that the leaders are of the
highest moral stature," he said.
Christine Kehoe, a lesbian and the City
Council member whose district includes the Scouts'
Balboa Park headquarters, said she was pleased by
Joseph's ruling. "I agree 100 percent with the
judge," Kehoe said. "The Boy Scouts should revise
that policy. They're really holding the kids hostage
by that policy of intolerance."
On the other hand, Bishop George
McKinney of St. Stephen's Church of God in Christ
said the ruling fits in with what he called "the moral
decay in the courts and schools and society in
general." "The ruling simply is continuing the trend
whereby the moral values that support family life
and the protection of children are being abandoned,"
he said.
Reprinted with permission.
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AMENDMENT 2 GETS ANOTHER DAY IN COURT
State's Attorney Argues That Gays Haven't Shown Need For Protection
Copyright 1994 Denver Publishing Company
Rocky Mountain News
July 1, 1994, Friday
Sue Lindsay; Rocky Mountain News Staff Writer
The bitter fight over Colorado's Amendment
2 landed in the state's highest court Thursday -
again.
Opponents and supporters of the gay-rights
measure argued their cases before the Colorado
Supreme Court, another hurdle in the long process to
determine whether the amendment passed by voters
in November 1992 will become law.
Amendment 2 is the first successful effort to
deny civil rights to a group since the 1960s, when
the civil rights movement gained power, said
Boulder attorney Jean Dubofsky, a former Colorado
Supreme Court justice who represented opponents.
But Colorado Solicitor General Tim
Tymokovich, while calling gay rights one of the
"most significant issues of the 1990s," said state
resources shouldn't be spent on civil rights
protections for gays and lesbians.
"They have not demonstated the need for
protection other groups have shown, " he said,
arguing that extending such protection would lessen
the respect for all civil rights laws.
Colorado is appealing an order by Denver
District Judge Jeffrey Bayless in December that
permanently bars enforcement of Amendment 2. The
initiative prohibits any state or local laws protecting
gays and lesbians from discrimination.
Bayless' injunction was upheld a year ago by
the state Supreme Court, which ruled 6-1 that
Amendment 2 violates the right of gays and lesbians
to participate equally in the political process. But the
court said the measure could pass constitutional
muster if the state could show a compelling reason
for it.
Several individuals and the cities of Denver,
Boulder and Aspen, which have ordinances
protecting gays, had sued to challenge its
constitutionality.
Tymkovich argued that, among other things,
citizens have the right to determine the moral
direction of the state and did so by passing
Amendment 2.
Dubofsky argued that homosexuals "are
politically powerless with respect to this amendment
because it took away their political power."
But Chief Justice Luis Rovira observed that
in the political process, "sometimes you win,
sometimes you lose, but that doesn't mean that you
are powerless."
The Supreme Court has granted an
"expedited" appeal to the case and a ruling is
expected by fall. Regardless of the outcome, the case
will be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
could rule as early as next summer if it accepts the
case.
Reprinted with permission of the Rocky
Mountain News.
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1991 CIVIL RIGHTS LAW NOT RETROACTIVE, COURT RULES
Copyright 1994 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
April 27, 1994, Wednesday, Final Edition
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court, in a long-awaited
opinion, ruled yesterday that a major 1991 civil
rights law did not apply to complaints pending at the
time it was enacted.
In a broadly written, 8 to 1 decision, the
court said that if Congress wants any new legislation
-- including benefits, taxes or other penalties -- to
apply retroactively, Congress must explicitly say so.
The ruling, arising from one of Congress's
most fractious legislative debates in recent years,
places a heavier burden on lawmakers who accept
ambiguous language in the heat of political
compromise.
The decision also puts an end to thousands
of lawsuits by aggrieved workers whose claims
depended on retroactive coverage under the 1991
act. That law made it easier for workers alleging job
bias to sue their employers and boosted the money
remedies available to those who win.
Its impetus was a series of Supreme Court
rulings, and the law's passage after a two-year
debate marked the largest single rejection of
Rehnquist Court opinions.
But Congress could not agree on when the
law should take effect and effectively punted to the
courts.
In an effort to try to influence a court
interpretation, Democrats made floor speeches saying
the restorative law would cover all pending cases;
Republicans countered that it should apply only to
future complaints.
"Since the early days of this court, we have
declined to give retroactive effect to statutes
burdening private rights [here, private companies'
practices] unless Congress had made clear its intent,"
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun was the lone
dissent, scoffing at one point that "at no time within
the last generation has an employer had a vested
right to engage in or permit sexual harassment," a
form of job discrimination. Blackmun said the ruling
"prolongs the life of" a narrow interpretation of civil
rights law that Congress "repudiated." While the
decision reminds Congress that the court is not going
to read into law what it does not have the will to
write into it, the ruling also is a rebuff to the Clinton
administration. The Justice Department had told the
justices the law should apply to cases pending in
1991, departing from the stance of the Bush
administration, which had fought the bill.
President George Bush vetoed a version of
the legislation in 1990, in part, he said, because that
version would have been retroactive.
The practical consequence of yesterday's
decision is that people challenging discrimination
before the date of the law's enactment, Nov. 21,
1991, do not have the benefit of the new law;
conversely, employers will not be subject to the new
liability and penalties for conduct that occurred
before the law took effect.
The statute allows people suing for
harassment and other intentional discrimination to
have their case heard by a jury and, if they prove
their case, to win money damages of as much as
$300,000. Juries are generally thought to be more
sympathetic to workers than judges are. Before
enactment of the legislation, only injunctive relief,
back pay and attorneys' fees were allowed under the
country's main job discrimination law, Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The part of the law that reversed the effects
of eight Supreme Court rulings, most of them from
1989, reinstated broad court interpretations of both
Title VII and a post-Civil War law called Section
1981 (named for its place in the statute books) that
allows blacks and other racial minorities to redress
job discrimination.
The court had ruled that Section 1981,
which prohibits racial discrimination in "contracts,"
applied only to hiring decisions. The 1991 law said
the section would bar racial harassment and other
forms of bias throughout an individual's
employment.
Two cases were before the court yesterday.
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Barbara
Landgraf, who worked for a USI plant in Tyler,
140
Tex., in the mid-1980s, sued the company after a
co-worker repeatedly sexually harassed her. A trial
court said she had been the victim of "continuous
and repeated inappropriate verbal comments and
physical contact," but said it was not severe enough
to force her to quit. While her appeal was pending,
the 1991 law took effect.
She said her case should be heard by a jury
and that she should be eligible for money damages,
based on the new law. The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled, as have all but one federal appeals
court, that the 1991 law did not apply to pending
cases.
In the second case, Rivers v. Roadway
Express, black mechanics Maurice Rivers and Robert
C. Davison alleged that their 1986 firings from
Roadway in Toledo were based on their race. They
sued under Section 1981, but before their claim
could be heard, the Supreme Court in June 1989
narrowed that law's coverage. The 6th U.S. Court of
Appeals subsequently forbade them to invoke the
statute enacted in 1991.
Advocates for the workers contended that
because some sections of the 1991 law specifically
limited the retroactive effect, others could be
interpreted as allowing retroactivity. But Stevens
said, "Given the high stakes of the retroactivity
question ... it would be surprising for Congress to
have chosen to resolve that question through negative
inferences... . "
"It seems likely that one of the compromises
that made it possible to enact the 1991 version was
an agreement not to include the kind of explicit
retroactivity command found in the 1990 bill,"
Stevens said. Indeed, the legislation was stalled by
White House complaints that it would encourage
frivolous lawsuits. Only in the political fallout from
the Clarence Thomas-Anita F. Hill sexual
harassment hearings was a compromise reached.
Stevens said it is only fair that individuals
know what the law is and can act accordingly. His
broadly written ruling suggested that the 1991 law
would not apply to any conduct that occurred before
the law was enacted.
Lawyers for the mechanics had argued that
they should have the benefit of the fully restored
race-discrimination law because Congress clearly
opposed the court's narrow interpretation of the law.
But Stevens said, "The choice to enact a statute that
responds to a judicial decision is quite distinct from
the choice to make the responding statute
retroactive."
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist may
have strategically assigned the opinion to Stevens
once the justices' votes were in. The rulings that
spurred Congress to act were decided by 5 to 4
votes, with Stevens, Blackmun, now-retired Justice
William J. Brennan Jr. and the late Thurgood
Marshall dissenting.
Glen Nager, who represented the employers
in the cases, said the ruling allows employers "fair
warning" about their liabilities. Elaine Jones,
director-counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, countered that the court leaves a
two-tier system.
o 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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PEERING INTO AN EMPLOYEE'S PAST
After-Acquired Evidence Can Scuttle Bias Suits
Copyright 1994 New York Law Publishing Company
New York Law Journal
July 18, 1994, Monday
Susan Ritz
THE HOTTEST issue on the employment
front this year is the use of after-acquired evidence.
Employers defending discrimination cases who
discover, after the offending discrimination has
occurred, that the plaintiff-employee engaged in
some form of misconduct, now seek to use that
evidence to dismiss the case entirely or, at a
minimum, to limit the plaintiff's recovery. Cases
where after-acquired evidence has been used include
ones involving misrepresentations on employment
applications, improper job performance and
appropriation of confidential information.
The grants of summary judgment to
employers are increasing. Space does not permit a
thorough analysis of all the cases, but given the
serious stakes, all employment attorneys should
quickly familiarize themselves with these
developments.
Attorneys will soon have the guidance of the
U.S. Supreme Court on this issue. The Court has
granted certiorari in a case from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co.' and will hear
argument in the fall 1994 term.
In the meantime, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has been silent on the subject.
Thus, this article will focus on the leading decisions
of several of the other federal circuits and the few
Southern District, Eastern District and New York
State cases to have been decided.
Two Categories
The decisions issued to date basically fall
into two categories: those that dismiss the plaintiff's
action and bar all recovery and those that only limit
the plaintiff's potential recovery. Of the five circuits
that have ruled on this subject, none have completely
rejected the sue of after-acquired evidence.
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co.' has become the leading case in support of
the more draconian relief of dismissal. The facts
involve a claims adjuster who was employed by the
company for 19 years. During his tenure, he was
reprimanded and even suspended for falsifying
company records. The company, however, continued
his employment until it terminated him, not for
falsification, but for poor work attitude and inability
to get along with others.
Summers sued, alleging age and religion
discrimination. Nearly four years after Summers'
discharge, the company, while preparing for trial,
reviewed more documents and discovered an
additional 150 instances of falsifications. Summers
did not deny these.
In Limine Motion
Shortly before trial, Summers' attorney filed
an in limine motion to exclude the after-acquired
evidence, and the employer cross-moved for
summary judgment. Summers argued that the
additional falsifications were irrelevant and
inadmissible because they were not discovered until
much later. State Farm argued that while the
additional falsifications could not have been a
grounds for Summers' discharge, relief was
precluded since Summers would have been
terminated even earlier if State Farm had known.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit ruled in favor of the employer after an
analysis of the mixed motives doctrine set forth in
the Supreme Court case of Mt. Healthy City School
District Bd. of Education v. Doyle.'
In Mt. Healthy, a teacher had been
discharged for two reasons: conveying an internal
school memorandum to a local disc jockey and
making an obscene gesture to two female students.
The Supreme Court ruled that the first ground for
discharge was protected by the First Amendment,
remanding to the district court to determine whether
the school board could show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that it would have reached the same
decision even in the absence of the protected
conduct. If the board met its burden, it would
prevail.
Applying Mt. Healthy, the Tenth Circuit
assumed for purposes of the motion that State Farm's
termination of Summers was motivated, at least in
part, if not substantially, by Summers's age and
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religion. It also accepted State Farm's contention
that the after-discovered falsifications were of a
serious and pervasive nature, and if State Farm had
known of them, it would have discharged Summers
earlier.
Employer Met Burden
The court then analogized to the case where
a company doctor is fired for discriminatory reasons,
but in the course of discovery, the employer learns
that he was not a doctor. Thus the Summers court
ruled that the employer had met its burden and since
no relief would be accorded to the doctor, no relief
could be granted to Summers.
The court also rejected Summers' claim that
there remained material issues of fact that required
a trial, finding that Summers' failure to deny the
falsification was sufficient to allow for dismissal of
this case.
Summers was later applied in McKennon, a
case that demonstrates the far reaching nature of the
developing case law.
In McKennon, the plaintiff had worked for
the defendant as a secretary for nearly 40 years and
had consistently been evaluated as an excellent
employee. As she approached age 62, McKennon
became afraid of termination for age-discriminatory
reasons. She copied and took home with several
confidential documents as protection to assist her in
pursuing a civil rights claim if the need arose.
Fears Came True
As McKennon feared, the company fired
her, and she filed an age discrimination suit. During
discovery, the employer learned that McKennon had
copied the documents and moved for summary
judgment dismissing the case.
The court acknowledged that McKennon's
deposition testimony contained substantial evidence
of age discrimination although it found the testimony
to be disputed. At the same time, it found that
McKennon was, without dispute, guilty of
misconduct and would have been discharged if the
employer had known.
McKennon argued that the after-acquired
evidence cases should not apply because there was
no employment application fraud4 and because there
was a "nexus" between the misconduct and the
discrimination, that is, she copied the documents to
protect herself. The court rejected the first argument,
relying on Summers and other cases.
The court also rejected the second argument,
reasoning, in a footnote, that under the nexus theory,
an employee who takes money from her employer to
support herself in anticipation of an unlawful
discharge would be excused. The court did note,
however, that employees could not be discharged for
protected activity set forth in the "opposition clause"
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In
other words, an employer's retaliatory actions are
still prohibited. On May 23, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in McKennon.
Eighth Circuit Case
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has also followed Summers in Welch v.
Liberty Machine Works Inc.' But the court held that
the employer bears a substantial burden of
establishing that its policy to terminate employees for
application misrepresentation predates the hiring and
firing of the employee in question, and that the
policy constitutes more than mere boilerplate
language on an employment contract or application.
The court further held that one self-serving
affidavit from management was insufficient to meet
this burden. The court remanded the case but held
open the possibility that in other cases an affidavit
might suffice.
It is noteworthy that Welch deals with
whether the employer would have hired the
employee. At least one other case, Washington v.
Lake County,6 has drawn a distinction between
whether the employer would have refused to hire if
it had known of the misrepresentation and whether
the employer would have fired an otherwise
satisfactory employee after it learned of the
misrepresentation. This distinction can be important
since the employer bears the burden of proving the
significance of the after-acquired evidence.
Wallace' and Progeny
The most prominent case limiting the impact
of after-acquired evidence is Wallace v. Dunn
Construction Co.7 In that case, a highway
flagperson had omitted a recent drug conviction from
her employment application. She later filed a lawsuit
alleging Equal Pay Act violations, sexual harassment
and retaliatory discharge. The employer discovered
the misrepresentation on the application during the
plaintiff's deposition and then moved for summaryjudgment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit explicitly rejected the Summers solution. It
agreed that the mixed motives analysis applies, it but
held that Summers constituted an unwarranted
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extension of Mt. Healthy because it excused all
liability based on what hypothetically would have
occurred absent the alleged discriminatory motive.
Wallace further held that Summers clashed
with the Mt. Healthy rule that the plaintiff should be
left in no worse position than if she had not been a
member of a protected class, because Summers
would at least have remained continuously employed
until the discovery was actually made. Instead,
Summers cut off recovery altogether.
Powerful Language
The Eleventh Circuit also used powerful
language to criticize the practical import of
Summers, stating:
[the decision] invites employers to establish
ludicrously low thresholds for "legitimate"
termination and to devote fewer resources to
preventing discrimination because Summers
gives them the option to escape all liability
by rummaging through an
unlawfully-discharged employee's
background for flaws and then
manufacturing a "legitimate" reason for the
discharge that fits the flaws in the
employee's background. [quotation marks in
original]'
The Wallace court concluded that the best
balance of all the interests is for the after-acquired
evidence to be used in fashioning the remedy. The
employer bears the burden of persuasion, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to show whether and
in what manner the after-acquired evidence would
have legitimately altered the employment relationship
and hence should affect the relief. If the employer
meets its burden, reinstatement and front pay are
precluded.
As for back pay, the employer must prove
that it would have discovered the after-acquired
evidence before what would otherwise be the end of
the back-pay period in the absence of the allegedly
unlawful acts and the litigation. The court explicitly
rejected cutting off back pay on the date that the
information was actually discovered because that
would provide a "windfall" to employers who, in the
absence of the unlawful act and ensuing litigation,
would never have discovered the evidence.
If the plaintiff demonstrates a retaliatory
discharge, then she is entitled to a presumption that
back pay is appropriate.
Declaratory Relief
The Wallace court also held that the plaintiff
may obtain declaratory relief and damages for a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim. And
the plaintiff may obtain liquidated damages under the
Equal Pay Act and attorneys' fees on all her claims,
although the after-acquired evidence may decrease
the amount of the award under traditional attorneys'
fees principles.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has straddled the line between Summers and
Wallace.
In Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co.,'
the Seventh Circuit distinguished Summers and
refused to grant an employer's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The court ruled that the
masquerading doctor hypothetical in Summers does
not apply unless the misrepresentation goes directly
to a job requirement. Although Kristufek never
discussed Wallace, it implemented a variation by
cutting back the damages awarded to the date the
fraud was discovered.
In another Seventh Circuit case,
Washington, the court granted summary judgment to
the employer of a jailer who had failed to disclose
prior convictions on his application. The court
accepted two affidavits from high level managers
attesting to the policy to discharge on these grounds.
It then shifted the burden to Washington to
"puncture" the affidavits even though the two
attesters would not have been the ultimate
decision-makers.
Avoid Surprises
Washington demonstrates how important it
is for a plaintiff's attorneys to take full discovery
when after-acquired evidence may be at issue.
Attorneys taken by surprise with a motion for
summary judgment should consider seeking leave for
additional discovery.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has yet to rule directly on the use of after-acquired
evidence. Three district court judges, however, have
considered the issue.
In Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers
Corp.,'o Southern District Judge Vincent L.
Broderick held that after-acquired evidence of
violation of a moonlighting policy, when combined
with the already alleged nondiscriminatory
justification for termination, warranted summary
judgment for the employer. Although the court did
not directly acknowledge Summers, the opinion
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relied on two law review articles that survey the use
of after-acquired evidence.
In Kravit v. Delta Air Lines Inc.," Eastern
District Judge I. Leo Glasser granted Delta summary
judgment in a suit brought by Kravit when he was
rejected for employment.
Prior Conviction
Kravit admitted at his job interview that he
had failed to disclose on his employment application
a prior conviction on a drug offense and stealing a
check. Delta contended that it does not hire people
who falsify their applications but affirmatively stated
that it had previously hired employees who had
honestly disclosed their prior convictions. Although
technically not an after-acquired evidence case, the
court noted that the majority of courts had followed
Summers over Wallace and granted summary
judgment for the employer.
The Kravit case raises two interesting points.
First, Delta's application stated that falsification
could be grounds for termination; it did not say that
it would be grounds. While this distinction was not
an issue in Kravit, because the plaintiff was never
hired, some courts -- for example, Kristufek and
Wallace -- have held that permissive language is
insufficient, alone, to justify termination.
Second, while New York law does not
prohibit inquiries into criminal convictions, it does
prohibit blanket discrimination against people with
convictions.
Public agencies and private employers are
precluded from denying employment based on a
person's criminal convictions or based on a finding
of a lack of "good moral character" as a result of
these convictions, unless 1) there is a direct
relationship between one or more of the previous
criminal offenses and the specific employment sought
or 2) the granting of the employment would involve
an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or
welfare of specific individuals or the general public.
Eight Criteria
The law -- Executive Law §296(15) and
Correction Law §§752, 753 -- also specifies eight
criteria to be considered by an employer in making
its determination and mandates a presumption of
rehabilitation when a certificate of relief from
disabilities has been issued.
In addition, Correction Law §754 permits an
employee who has a criminal record to request and
receive a written statement setting forth the reasons
for the denial. Thus, employers who seek to use
after-acquired evidence of a criminal conviction in
New York will be put to a stringent test.
Finally, in Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, 2 Judge Morris E. Lasker adopted
the Wallace rule and denied summary judgment. He
ruled that there were two questions of fact to be
resolved: whether the bank would have declined to
hire Moodie if it had known of his misrepresentation
regarding a previous job and whether the
misstatement was material and constituted sufficient
cause to require termination under the bank's policy.
Judge Lasker also held that the mixed
motives doctrine does not apply where the evidence
used to justify the termination was acquired after the
employment-related decision.
State Case
One recent New York State court case,
Bompane v. Enzolabs, 3 arose as a whistleblower
statute violation. The court refused to dismiss the
case based on an after-acquired discovery of an
employment application misrepresentation, but it
cited two other opinions where such termination was
justified. Those cases emphasize the materiality of
the misrepresentation and therefore appear to raise a
mixed question of law and fact, precluding summary
judgment.
When it comes to the use of after-acquired
evidence, emotions run high on both sides of the
fence. Plaintiffs' advocates argue that the cards are
stacked against them. Even though the burden of
persuasion is on the employer to demonstrate that the
after-acquired evidence would have resulted in
termination or refusal to hire, all of the evidence is
within the defendant's control.
Furthermore, a grant of summary judgment
deprives the employee of an opportunity to appeal to
a jury to make all reasonable inferences. At the same
time, plaintiffs' advocates argue, the Summers
approach creates a virtual underclass of employees
who are vulnerable to abusive employer tactics
because at some time in their lives they committed
an infraction of the law or ran into a problem in
their jobs.
Hobson's Choice
Indeed, an employee who has been
terminated, whether for just cause or the most
egregious of abusive discharges, faces the Hobson's
choice of admitting that termination and risking an
uphill battle to find a job or falsifying a job
application and becoming vulnerable to discharge at
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any time for a discriminatory reason even after a Copyright ol 1994 The New York Law
stellar job performance. Publishing Co. Reprinted with permission.
Employers' advocates respond that
employers have a right to know whom they are
hiring. They also contend that they should not be
required to pay damages to an employee whom they
would not have hired but for the employee's fraud,
or whom they would have fired but for the fortuity
that the misconduct was not discovered.
Perhaps the Supreme Court will answer
these and other questions in the fall 1994 term.
Susan Ritz is a litigation partner at Steel Bellman
Ritz & Clark, P. C., with specialties in civil rights
and personal injury. Theodora Langbaum, a summer
law intern at the firm, and a student at New York
University School of Law, assisted in the preparation
of this article.
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doctrine was applied to employment-related misconduct.
5. - F.3d -, 62 USLW 2696 (8th Cir. 1994). This opinion
has not been released for publication in the present law
reports. Until released, it is subject to revision or
withdrawal.
6. 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
7. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
8. Id. at 1180.
9. 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
10. 844 F. Supp. 183 (SDNY 1994).
11. 60 FEP Cases 994 (EDNY 1992)
12. 831 F. Supp. 333 (SDNY 1993).
13. 608 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1994).
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SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE IF 2 WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT
Copyright 1994 Denver Publishing Company
Rocky Mountain News
June 19, 1994, Sunday
Gilbert M. Roman
The most controversial issue in employment
discrimination law will soon be decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court when it takes up the case of
McKennon vs. Nashville Banner. The issue is
"after-acquired evidence," and it theoretically
affects every American worker.
The high court will decide whether evidence
of wrongdoing acquired after an employee's
termination bars an employee from pursuing his or
her employment discrimination case. Courts across
the country are divided down the middle on this
issue.
Civil rights groups, employer organizations
and Congress will likely use the case's outcome as a
benchmark in acting on cases of resume fraud and
other forms of after-acquired evidence.
In McKennon vs. Nashville Banner, plaintiff
Christine McKennon claims her employer terminated
her at age 62 because of age discrimination. For
purposes of summary judgment, the company did not
dispute liability - but the Nashville Banner, a
newspaper, said it should be absolved of the
discrimination charge because of "after-acquired
evidence" indicating McKennon was a bad
employee.
The newpaper's attorney said McKennon
copied and took home company documents that she
thought would help her win the age discrimination
case. She took these documents after filing suit but
while still employed.
After she was fired, the company found out
what she had done. They immediately sent her a
"termination letter - although she was already fired
- saying if they had known about the documents,
they would have fired her then. This is the essence
of the "after-acquired defense." Other forms of this
evidence include falsehoods recorded on resumes or
employment applications.
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Cincinnati
sided with the employer and dismissed McKennon's
age discrimination claim, citing the after-acquired
evidence. According to the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, such evidence is a "complete bar to any
recovery by the former employee where the
employer can show it would have fired the employee
on the basis of the evidence."
This is what the U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to review. The court can expect to hear civil
rights advocates argue that the after-acquired
evidence defense turns the anti-discrimination statutes
on their head.
As another Court of Appeals in Atlanta has
pointed out, allowing after- acquired defenses in
effect does not encourage employers to stop illegal
discrimination. Worse, it gives employers incentive
to rummage through an unlawfully-discharged
employee's background looking for imperfections
that will erase the company's liability.
Recognizing this, the court has concluded
that after-acquired evidence may affect the victim's
damages, but does not release the employer from all
discriminatory conduct.
The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has noted the curiousness of a doctrine
that actually encourages employers to examine the
former employee's conduct in search of flaws that
may provide a defense of company practices.
Reprinted with permission.
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93-1543 McKENNON v. NASHVILLE BANNER
PUBLISHING CO.
Discharge-Age-After-acquired evidence.
Ruling below (CA 6, 9 F.3d 539, 62 LW 2371,
63 FEP Cases 354):
After-acquired evidence doctrine, which bars
relief for former employee alleging employment
discrimination upon employer's showing that it
would have fired employee if it had been aware of
misconduct at time it occurred, applies to miscon-
duct that occurs during employment as well as to
fraud in employment applications, and any al-
leged nexus between misconduct and employee's
discrimination clain is irrelevant to application
of doctrine; accordingly, summary judgment was
properly granted to employer in Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act case brought by termi-
nated employee who admitted in deposition that,
while still employed, she copied confidential doc-
uments and took copies home, action for which it
is undisputed that she would have been fired
immediately had employer known of it when it
occurred, even though employee claimed that she
copied documents for future use in contesting her
expected discharge on account of age.
Question presented: Is employee who is dis-
missed in violation of ADEA barred from obtain-
ing any remedy if, solely as result of unlawful
dismissal and litigation challenging it, employer
discovers another basis for dismissal, question
previously accepted for review by court in Mil!i-
gan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975
F.2d 302 (CA 6 1992), cert. granted, 61 LW
3851, cert. dismissed, 62 LW 3113 (1993)?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/30/94, by Mi-
chael E. Terry, of Nashville, Tenn., and Elaine R.
Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Charles Stephen Ral-
ston, Eric Schnapper, and NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educational Fund Inc., all of New York,
N.Y.
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BAILEY BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.
In this age discrimination suit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29
U.S.C. § 621, et seq., the plaintiff, Christine
McKennon, appeals the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant Nashville
Banner Publishing Co. ("the Nashville Banner" or
"the Banner"). The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission filed an amicus curiae brief in support
of Mrs. McKennon, and the Equal Employment
Advisory Council filed one in support of the
Nashville Banner.
The plaintiff claims that the Nashville
Banner violated her rights by discharging her at the
age of sixty-two on the basis of age and that the
district court misapplied the "after-acquired
evidence" doctrine by allowing evidence of certain
misconduct during her employment, discovered by
the Banner after her termination, to negate her claim.
See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,
797 F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992). Because we
determine the district court properly applied the
after-acquired evidence doctrine to the facts of this
case, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of
summary judgment.
I
The Nashville Banner employed Mrs.
McKennon from May 1951 to October 31, 1990,
when she was terminated. Mrs. McKennon worked
primarily as a secretary, and over the years the
company consistently evaluated her work
performance as excellent. On May 6, 1991, Mrs.
McKennon filed suit claiming age discrimination.
While deposing her in December 1991, the Nashville
Banner discovered Mrs. McKennon had, while
employed as secretary to the Comptroller, Ms.
Stoneking, copied and removed from the
newspaper's premises several confidential documents
to which she had access as such secretary. She took
the documents home and showed them to her
husband.' Mrs. McKennon asserted she copied the
documents "in an attempt to learn information
regarding my job security concerns" and for her
"insurance" and "protection." As a result, the Banner
sent Mrs. McKennon a "termination letter" in
December 1991, asserting it would have terminated
her immediately during her employment if it had
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known of her acts. It is undisputed, from the
testimony of Banner executives, that the Banner
would have discharged Mrs. McKennon when she
took and copied the records if it had then known that
she had done so.
The Banner's summary judgment motion
assumed, for purposes of the motion, that it would
be liable to Mrs. McKennon under the ADEA in
discharging her for age discrimination' but for the
undisputed fact that, before she was discharged,
Mrs. McKennon was guilty of conduct which, if
known by the Banner, would have caused her
discharge.' The district court, in granting summary
judgment, agreed with this proposition. It determined
that, because it was undisputed that Mrs. McKennon
was guilty of misconduct, prior to her discharge, that
would, if known by the Banner, have caused her
discharge, the Banner was entitled to summary
judgment. The district court concluded that this
result must follow because Mrs. McKennon did not
suffer injury from the claimed violation. McKennon,
797 F. Supp. at 608.
Mrs. McKennon contends on appeal that the
after-acquired evidence rule should not apply to
defeat her age discrimination claim. She argues that
her situation is distinct from other cases involving
after-acquired evidence because her action concerns
employee misconduct during employment rather than
employment application fraud and also because a
nexus exists between her wrongful conduct and her
discrimination claim.4
II
This court reviews the district court's grant
of summary judgment de novo, making all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331,
334 (6th Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is
appropriate where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
III
We first address in this case the question
whether the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the Nashville Banner based on
after-acquired, undisputed evidence of Mrs.
McKennon's misconduct in copying and removing
confidential files and that she would have been
discharged for such conduct. More specifically, the
issue is whether the after-acquired evidence doctrine
applies exclusively to cases of employment
application fraud or whether it also applies, as here,
to cases of employee misconduct during employment.
The seminal case establishing the
after-acquired evidence doctrine in employment
discrimination cases is Summers v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988). The
doctrine mandates judgment as a matter of law for an
employer charged with discrimination if evidence of
the plaintiff employee's misconduct surfaces at some
time after the termination of the employee, and the
employer can prove it would have fired the employee
on the basis of the misconduct if it had known of it.
In Summers, the employee claimed he was fired on
the basis of his age and race, in violation of the
ADEA and Title VII. Four years after the discharge,
while preparing for trial, the employer discovered
evidence that the employee falsified records in 150
instances.s The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment for the employer, reasoning that while the
after-acquired evidence could not have been the
actual cause of the employee's discharge, it was
relevant and determinative as to the employee's
claim of injury, and precluded the grant of any relief
or remedy. Id. at 708.
This circuit adopted the Summers
after-acquired evidence rule in Johnson v. Honeywell
Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992), a
diversity action under Michigan law. In Johnson, the
plaintiff sued her former employer alleging that she
was discharged in violation of Michigan's
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. During discovery,
the employer learned that the plaintiff had
misrepresented her educational background on her
employment application, for example, claiming to
have a bachelor's degree when in fact she did not.
The court held that:
on these facts, even if we assume that
Honeywell discharged Johnson in retaliation
for her opposition to violations of the Act,
she is not entitled to relief. Because
Honeywell established that it would not have
hired Johnson and that it would have fired
her had it become aware of her resume
fraud during her employment, Johnson is
entitled to no relief, even if she could prove
a violation of Elliott-Larsen.
Id. at 415.
The Johnson court noted, however, that evidence of
an employee's resume fraud "must establish valid
and legitimate reasons for the termination of
employment." Id. at 414.
We reiterated our
Summers after-acquired
Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan
commitment to the
evidence rule in
Technological Univ.,
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975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61
U.S.L.W. 3851, cert. dismissed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3113
(1993). In Milligan-Jensen, the plaintiff produced
evidence that her employer violated Title VII by
discriminating against her on the basis of her sex.
After the employee's discharge, however, the
defendant discovered the employee had omitted a
DUI conviction from her employment application.
We held that this omission was material and
explained that because the plaintiff's falsification, "if
discovered during her employment, would have
resulted in [her] termination, it becomes irrelevant
whether or not she was discriminated against . . . ."
Id. at 305. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review this case, but dismissed it after the parties
settled. Thus, in Johnson and Milligan-Jensen, we
have firmly endorsed the principle that after-acquired
evidence is a complete bar to any recovery by the
former employee where the employer can show it
would have fired the employee on the basis of the
evidence.6
Moreover, the Summers case, from which
this circuit adopted the after-acquired evidence rule,
did not involve resume fraud, but like this case
involved evidence of employee misconduct. In
Summers, the plaintiff falsified company records
more than 150 times. 864 F.2d at 703.
Finally, we agree with a district court which
recently applied the after-acquired evidence doctrine
in a factually similar situation. O'Day v. McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D.
Ariz. 1992). In O'Day, a former employee who
alleged he was discriminated against under the
ADEA surreptitiously removed his confidential
personnel file, photocopied portions of the file, and
showed some of the material to a co-worker. Id. at
1467. The court noted that the issue of whether an
employer would actually fire an employee for
misconduct could generate a genuine issue of
material fact in some cases. Citing an employee
handbook and an affidavit by a company official
indicating that the plaintiff would have been
immediately fired for his conduct, however, the
court determined there was no question the employer
would have fired the plaintiff and the employer was
therefore entitled to summary judgment. Id. at
1468-70. Similarly, statements of the Banner officials
that McKennon would have been fired had the
newspaper known she had removed confidential
documents support summary judgment in favor of
the Banner.
IV
We next turn to whether the after-acquired
evidence doctrine applies to cases where there is an
alleged nexus between the employee's misconduct
and the discrimination claim. Mrs. McKennon claims
she copied and removed the confidential documents
only because she feared for her job and thus her
conduct was justified. We thus understand her
contention to be that, if the Banner should discharge
her, she would have a lever with which to resist that
action. We find that such an alleged nexus is
irrelevant to the application of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine.' The sole issue in after-acquired
evidence cases is whether the employer would have
fired the plaintiff employee on the basis of the
misconduct had it known of the misconduct. See
Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 304-305.1
V
For the aforementioned reasons, we
AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant.
ENDNOTES
1. The documents included: Nashville Banner Fiscal Period
Payroll Ledger dated 9/30/89; Nashville Banner Publishing
Co., Inc., Profit and Loss Statement dated 10/30/89; a note
from Elise McMillan to Simpkins; a memorandum from
Imogene Stoneking to Irby C. Simpkins, Jr., dated 2/3/89; a
handwritten note dated 2/8; and an Agreement between the
Banner and one of its managing employees, notarized 3/1/89.
2. The summary judgment record contains substantial
deposition testimony of Mrs. McKennon that she was indeed
discharged because of age. This contention, however, is
disputed by other testimony.
3. Several officers of the Banner have sworn in affidavits that
Mrs. McKennon would have been discharged for such
conduct, and McKennon testified at one point in her
deposition that she would have been terminated for this
conduct. There, then, is no substantial issue here. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 91
L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
4. As we understand the appellant's "nexus" argument, it is
that her improper taking of the records cannot be a basis for
a denial of her claim under the ADEA because she took the
records to give her a basis to contest her expected discharge
because of her age.
5. The employer was also aware during Summer's
employment that he had falsified some company records. The
company placed him on probationary status for two weeks
and warned him never again to falsify company records, but
he did not heed that advice. 864 F.2d at 702.
6. See also Paglio v. Chagrin Valley Hunt Club Corp., 966
F.2d 1453, 1992 WL 144674 at * 2 (6th Cir. 1992)(unpublished) ("even if the Club was motivated to discharge
Paglio because of his age, the misuse of Club funds
discovered after Paglio's retirement provided an independent
basis for termination."); Dotson v. United States Postal Serv.,
977 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d
193, 113 S. Ct. 263 (1992) ("Even though plaintiffs failure
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to complete the application truthfully was discovered
post-termination, he is not entitled to handicap discrimination
relief when he was not initially qualified for the position.");
Baab v. AMR Services Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ohio
1993) (interpreting Ohio law and holding former employee's
state discriminatory discharge claims were barred by
after-acquired evidence of employee's misstatements on
employment application); Bray v. Forest Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 115, 117 (S.D. Ohio 1993) ("as the
Defendant has shown that the misrepresentations or omissions
[on former employee's application] were material, were relied
upon by the employer in making its decisions, and are
clearly directly related to measuring the candidate for this
type of employment, the post-discharge discovery of
falsification renders summary judgment appropriate in this
case."); and Benson v. Quanex Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3689, 1992 WL 63013 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(unpublished) (granting summary judgment to employer in
racial harassment and constructive discharge action under
Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act because the
employer showed it would not have hired the employee had
it known of the employee's prior felony conviction and
incarceration).
7. Of course, if the employee's "misconduct" falls into the
category of protected activities set forth in the "opposition
clause" to the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), the employer
could not avoid liability for discriminatory actions based
upon the employee's conduct. Under § 623(d), Opposition to
unlawful practices; participation in investigations,
proceedings, or litigation
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because such individual . . . has
opposed any practice made unlawful by this section,
or because such individual . .. has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this
chapter.
See Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action
Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding plaintiff
employee's copying of confidential documents interfered with
the employer's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
employee records, and thus was not protected conduct); and
O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp.
1466, 1470 (D. Ariz. 1992) (holding "no reasonable jury
would find that O'Day's conduct, surreptitiously removing
confidential management files from his supervisor's desk,
photocopying them, and showing the file to a co-worker, was
reasonable in light of the circumstances."). Copying and
removing confidential documents is clearly not protected
conduct.
8. We note, incidentally, that if Mrs. McKennon's nexus
theory were adopted, it would apply where an employee takes
money from her employer for support of herself in
anticipation of an unlawful discharge.
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93-1758 GIDDENS v. SHELL OIL CO.
Male supervisor's harassment of male subord
nate-Sex stereotyping.
Ruling below (CA 5, 12/6/93, unpublished):
Male employee's allegations of harassment by
male supervisor do not state claim under Title
VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act even though harass-
ment has sexual overtones.
Question presented: Is severe and pervasive
pattern of verbal and physical abuse of sexual
nature visited upon male employee by heterosex-
ual male supervisor and heterosexual male co-
workers, which is based on sex stereotyping by
said supervisor and co-workers and which results
in hostile and abusive working environment, ac-
tionable under Title VII?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/18/94, by Melis-
sa Hirsch, of Odessa, Texas.
93-1877 STOCK v. UNIVERSAL FOODS CORP.
Affirmative action-Complaint by unsuccessful
white job applicant.
Ruling below (CA 4, 1/19/94, unpublished):
Although unsuccessful white job applicant who
claims that employer's failure to hire him violat-
ed 42 USC 1981 met his initial burden of raising
inference of impermissible racial discrimination,
employer met its burden of producing legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for hiring qualified
black applicant by presenting evidence that black
applicant was hired under affirmative action plan
that was implemented in response to past dis-
crimination following negative audit by Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, sets an-
nual hiring goals, does not contain quotas, and is
of limited duration.
Question presented: Does respondent's imple-
mentation of its affirmative action plan trammel
rights of majority in violation of 42 USC 1981?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/18/94, by
Charles B. Zuravin, and Zuravin & Trock P.A.,
both of Columbia, Md.
93-1841 ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS INC. v.
PENA
Award of highway construction contracts-Race-
based set aside program-Standard of review.
Ruling below (CA 10, 16 F.3d 1537):
Proper standard for reviewing constitutionality
of federal program designed to provide contract
awards for businesses owned by certain minority
groups is found in Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S.
448 (1980), which held that if Congress has
mandated race-conscious program, court must
apply "lenient standard, resembling intermediate
scrutiny," rather than test set forth in Richmond,
Va. v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 57 LW
4132 (1989), which required strict level of scruti-
ny for state or local minority preference pro-
grams; federal agency need not make independ-
ent findings of past discrimination in order to
justify use of race-conscious program implement-
ed in accordance with federal requirements; Sec-
tion 502 of Small Business Act, which provides
statutory authorization for challenged program,
does not unconstitutionally delegate to federal
agencies authority to develop minority participa-
tion goals and means for achieving those goals;
equal protection requirements are not violated by
program that, rather than requiring use of minor-
ity-owned businesses, merely induces prime con-
tractors to award subcontracts to minority-owned
firms through incentive payments of up to 2
percent of original contract amount to prime
contractors whose subcontracts with minority-
owned businesses exceed 10 percent of prime
contract.
Questions presented: (1) Does congressional
race-based set aside program for awarding high-
way construction contracts survive as applied con-
stitutional challenge when that program seeks to
remedy alleged broad-based societal discrimina-
tion, rather than clearly identifiable discrimina-
tion perpetuated by governmental entity seeking
to remedy discrimination? (2) Is "strict scruti-
ny," as opposed to "lenient standard, resembling
intermediate scrutiny," proper standard of review
for determining constitutionality of race-based
program adopted by Congress? (3) Does Fifth
Amendment require federal agency, in imple-
menting federal race-based set aside program and
when exceeding goals adopted by Congress, to
conduct inquiry set forth in Richmond. Va. v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 57 LW 4132
(1989)?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/17/94, by Wil-
liam Perry Pendley, Todd S. Welch, and Moun-
tain States Legal Foundation, all of Denver,
Colo.
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